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INTRODUCTION 
The United States government, through many different agencies, has spent decades 
extensively monitoring constitutionally protected activities of its citizens. From the 
communications of prominent activists1 to the mundane phone conversations of the politically 
uninvolved,2 we are finding more and more that what we say and do in our everyday lives is no 
longer part of the private sphere, but is increasingly absorbed into the amorphous, indefinitely 
extensive, and nearly omnipresent mass of information at the disposal of government. 
                                                                  
*   Carlos Torres is a graduate of the University of Pennsylvania and the University of Michigan Law School. His work 
history includes work at the Georgia Capital Defender’s Office, the University of Michigan Health System, Human Rights 
Watch as a Program in Refugee and Asylum Law Fellow, and public service in civil rights enforcement. Azadeh 
Shahshahani is President of the National Lawyers Guild and previously served as National Security/Immigrants’ Rights 
Project Director with the ACLU of Georgia. She is a 2004 graduate of the University of Michigan Law School and also 
has a Master’s in Modern Middle Eastern and North African Studies from Michigan. Tye Tavaras has a background in 
International Studies, Arabic, and Public International Law. She is a graduate of Emory University, The American 
University in Cairo, and Emory University School of Law. In addition to working at Emory University as a Study Abroad 
Advisor, she has served as a contributing writer to Mic and Ramel Media. The authors would like to thank the following 
students for their research support: Max T. Eichelberger, Rachel Reed, and Katie Rookard. The authors would also like to 
thank Elisa Wong for her help with initial research for the Article. 
1  See Allison Jones, The 2008 FBI Guidelines: Contradiction of Original Purpose, 19 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 
137, 138 (2009). 
2  See Photo Gallery: NSA Documentation of Spying in Germany, SPIEGEL ONLINE (July 29, 2013), 
http://www.spiegel.de/fotostrecke/photo-gallery-nsa-documentation-of-spying-in-germany-fotostrecke-99672-2.html. 
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This Article begins with a general introduction to the surveillance currently underway in 
our country, with a focus from just after the 9/11 tragedy to the present day. This will be followed 
with a brief history of surveillance and race, from racial profiling to the Counterintelligence 
Program (“COINTELPRO”), the first major break in understanding the extent and nature of the 
surveillance state. By examining the mapping of communities of color in Georgia as a 
representative illustration of the broader system of surveillance, the Article delves into more 
extensive questions of international and constitutional law. 
I. PUBLIC SURVEILLANCE 
In an October 2011 letter to Attorney General Eric Holder, the American Civil Liberties 
Union (“ACLU”) urged the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI” and the “Bureau”) to curtail 
the “overbroad investigative authorit[y] the FBI has claimed” in its investigation of American 
citizens based on racial, ethnic, religious, and political profiles.3 The letter summarizes how the 
FBI used its authority to spy on political advocacy organizations,4 gained expanded authority to 
operate in a new context under the pretext of threat assessment,5 significantly expanded the broad-
scale usage of telephonic and e-mail surveillance,6 and garnered a doubt-inducing 4.02% rate for 
conversion of assessments to preliminary or full investigations.7 Nearly as egregious as the 
surveillance itself is the authority of the FBI to retain a plethora of information indefinitely—
information that has not risen to the “reasonable indication” standard necessary to open a full 
investigation.8 Not uncommonly, the information collected, reviewed, and transmitted within the 
agency often has nothing to do with criminality, but rather the intimate details of people’s lives.9 
                                                                  
3  Letter from ACLU to Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General, 1 (Oct. 20, 2011) [hereinafter Holder Letter], 
available at https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/aclu_letter_to_ag_re_rm_102011_0.pdf. 
4  Id. at 2. 
5  Id. 
6  Id. 
7  See id. (noting that of 82,325 assessments, only 3,315 resulted in full or preliminary investigations) (citing 
Charlie Savage, FBI Focusing on Security Over Ordinary Crime, N.Y. TIMES, (Aug. 23, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2011/08/24/us/24fbi.html). This statistic is not a conviction rate, and counts only incidents where there was sufficient 
evidence to surpass the subjective standard involved in opening an assessment. A full investigation must be based on “an 
articulable factual basis of a ‘reasonable indication’ that a federal criminal violation or threat to the national security ‘has 
or may have occurred, is or may be occurring, or will or may occur . . . .’” OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE FBI’S INVESTIGATIONS OF CERTAIN DOMESTIC ADVOCACY GROUPS 10 (2010) 
(alteration in original), available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/s1009r.pdf. The FBI notes that the “‘reasonable 
indication’ standard is ‘substantially lower than probable cause.’” Id. 
8  Holder Letter, supra note 3, at 3 (“A 2009 FBI Counterterrorism Division ‘Baseline Collection Plan’ 
obtained by the ACLU through FOIA reveals the broad scope of information the FBI gathers during Assessments and 
retains in its systems: identifying information (date of birth, social security number, driver’s license and passport number, 
etc.), telephone and e-mail addresses, current and previous addresses, current employer and job title, recent travel history, 
whether the person lives with other adults, possesses special licenses or permits or has received specialized training, and 
whether the person has purchased firearms or explosives.”). 
9  Mollie Reilly, NSA Workers Might Be Sharing Your Nude Photos, HUFFINGTON POST (July 17, 2014), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/07/17/nsa-nude-photos_n_5597472.html. 
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Such information has been collected on an ongoing, daily basis.10 
These investigations do not stop at the individual level. As a predicate to finding the 
targets for individual investigations, the FBI also preliminarily and without a convincingly 
articulable standard engages in geo-mapping of ethnic communities when doing so will 
“‘reasonably aid in the analysis of potential threats and vulnerabilities’ and assist in ‘intelligence 
analysis.’”11 By tracking the movements of persons within ethnic areas and the locations of 
“ethnically-oriented businesses and other facilities,”12 the FBI, as instructed by its 2008 internal 
Domestic Investigation and Operations Guide (“DIOG”), catalogues “specific and relevant ethnic 
behavior”13 in particular locations. This data collection extends to “‘behavioral and cultural 
information about ethnic or racial communities’ that may be exploited by criminals or terrorists 
‘who hide within those communities.’”14 This program is known as “Domain Management.”15 It 
relies on broad-brush, stereotypical associations between perceived criminality and affiliation 
with ethnic, national, religious, or political groups to justify surveilling and curtailing the civil 
liberties of people solely on the basis of belonging to these groups.16 
This racial, ethnic, religious, and political profiling is an affront not to only the collective 
consciousness, but the FBI’s own internal directives. The U.S. Department of Justice’s Guidance 
Regarding the Use of Race by Federal Law Enforcement Agencies17 prohibits race from being 
used “to any degree” in law enforcement action or decision-making without a specific indication 
of its appropriateness (i.e., a specific description of a particular perpetrator, witness, or other 
actor).18 However, in the case of national security and border integrity investigations, this 
restriction is very neatly loop-holed out of existence.19 These exceptions, barely facially neutral, 
                                                                  
10  See In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from Verizon Bus. 
Network Servs., Inc., no. BR 13-80, 2 (FISA Ct. Apr. 25, 2013), available at https://epic.org/privacy/nsa/Section-215-
Order-to-Verizon.pdf. 
11  Holder Letter, supra note 3, at 3; see FBI, DOMESTIC INVESTIGATIONS AND OPERATIONS GUIDE 32 
(2008) [hereinafter DIOG], available at http://vault.fbi.gov/FBI%20Domestic%20Investigations%20and%20Operatio 
ns%20Guide%20%28DIOG%29/fbi-domestic-investigations-and-operations-guide-diog-2008-version. 
12  ACLU, UNLEASHED AND UNACCOUNTABLE: THE FBI’S UNCHECKED ABUSE OF AUTHORITY 14 (2013), 
available at https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/unleashed-and-unaccountable-fbi-report.pdf (citing DIOG, 
supra note 11, at 32). 
13  Holder Letter, supra note 3, at 3 (quoting DIOG at 33) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
14  ACLU, supra note 12 (quoting DIOG, supra note 11, at 34). 
15  See id. at 14. 
16  Id. at 15-17 (noting various ethnicities and nationalities, such as Hispanic, African-American, Chinese, 
Russian, and their supposed criminal associations based on crude stereotypes used as predicates to unwarranted 
surveillance of constitutionally protected activities). 
17  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUIDANCE REGARDING THE USE OF RACE BY FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 
AGENCIES (2003), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/guidance_on_race.pdf. 
18  Holder Letter, supra note 3, at 3. The perversity of racial indications of criminality leads not only to 
surveillance and targeting of particular individuals based on their guilt by association with others of their own racial or 
ethnic group—which leads to a particularly wide-range of curtailment of constitutionally protected, everyday activities—
but also to myopia regarding who it is that can commit particular crimes, demonstrated by the elimination from law 
enforcement and popular consciousness of the non-brown domestic terroristic threats represented by men like Ted 
Kaczynski, Timothy McVeigh, or the Covenant, the Sword and the Arm of the Lord. 
19  Holder Letter, supra note 3, at 3; ACLU, supra note 12, at 14. 
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lead to the targeting of Latino populations (given that our most active border is to the south) and 
Middle Eastern populations (given the colloquial association between terrorism and persons of 
Middle Eastern origin). Most unfortunately, the historical lack of religious profiling restrictions 
has led to the further victimization of ethnic and immigrant populations, given the extensive 
intersection of immigration status and minority religious status (i.e., Islam).20 Middle Eastern 
Muslim immigrants, for example, already have three strikes against them in the surveillance 
regime—and as such, their information and personal liberty are likely far from secure. 
Often the most mundane of activities are reported under these constitutionally dubious 
circumstances.21 Examples of activities reported by ordinary citizens include Middle Eastern 
males purchasing large pallets of water, a professor taking photos of buildings for his art class, a 
Middle Eastern physician neighbor being “unfriendly,” or protestors engaged in a scheduled 
action sending an email regarding their concerns about the potential for police use of abusive 
force.22 When the government effectively deputizes its citizens (using untrained persons in pursuit 
of law enforcement priorities) to become reporting parties,23 and the law enforcement community 
engages in blatant profiling without reasonable suspicion, it is inevitable that a large number of 
innocent persons, groups, and activities will become the subject of unwarranted suspicion and 
surveillance. Such surveillance not only chills one’s speech and perceived liberty, but may 
actually change the content of one’s identity.24 Indiscriminate, mass surveillance activities may in 
fact be causing the United States to miss clues about terrorist activity that might be discovered 
with more limited, focused monitoring.25 
II. WHAT IT IS, AND WHAT IT IS NOT: SURVEILLANCE IN LEGAL HISTORY  
AND ITS CURRENT LEGAL STATUS 
The effectiveness of public surveillance lies in the ability of the state to keep its activities 
secret. Secrecy, however, is not innate to the state, but is itself a legal construction with a 
                                                                  
20  See generally  PEW RESEARCH CTR., MUSLIM AMERICANS: NO SIGNS OF GROWTH IN ALIENATION OR 
SUPPORT FOR EXTREMISM, (2011), available at http://people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/Muslim%20American% 
20Report%2010-02-12%20fix.pdf. Sixty-three percent of American Muslims are immigrants. Id. at 8. Seventy percent of 
American Muslims identify as non-white, as compared to thirty-two percent of the U.S. population as a whole in 2011. See 
id. at 119.  
21  Race, color, religion and national origin are all constitutionally protected classes under the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 243 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000h-6 (2012)), and 
citizenship status is protected for employment purposes under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. 
No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
22  Julia Harumi Mass and Michael German, The Government is Spying on You: ACLU Releases New 
Evidence of Overly Broad Surveillance of Everyday Activities, ACLU (Sept. 19, 2013, 10:15AM), http://www.aclu.org/ 
blog/national-security-technology-and-liberty/government-spying-you-aclu-releases-new-evidence. 
23  If You See Something, Say SomethingTM, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., http://www.dhs.gov/if-you-see-
something-say-something (last visited June 29, 2015). 
24  Frank Rudy Cooper, Surveillance and Identity Performance: Some Thoughts Inspired by Martin Luther 
King, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 517, 536-38 (2008). 
25  Ellen Nakashima, Snowden: Mass Surveillance is Backfiring on U.S. Efforts to Combat Terrorism, 
WASH. POST (Mar. 10, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/snowden-mass-surveillance-is-
backfiring-on-us-in-effort-to-combat-terrorism/2014/03/10/61573dfa-a877-11e3-8d62-419db477a0e6_story.html. 
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tumultuous, and unwarrantedly successful, history in American law. Moreover, the decisions 
about what to keep secret—far from being matters of democratic debate—have been left to the 
agencies producing the information and standing to lose the most if it is revealed. The lack of 
judicial review and oversight and the fragmentation of the intelligence community, combined 
with a culture of rampant secrecy, have created a nebulous, constitutionally dubious status quo.26 
The privilege of the state to keep particular matters secret extends far back into our 
monarchical roots. In 2007, in In re Sealed Case, the D.C. Circuit reminded us that a state secrets 
privilege has long been recognized27—coded phrasing that implies the privilege is a matter of 
English common law.28 Various authors have located this privilege in traditions shielding the 
internal machinations of royal courts from the plebian view, and to kings refusing to allow certain 
debates to take place in Parliament.29 The state secret privilege was not explicitly adopted in the 
United States until 1953, in United States v. Reynolds,30 when government lawyers brought it to 
bear with great force, refusing to comply with judges’ orders to produce materials for 
examination, even ex parte, in camera, citing the danger to national security that such information 
would cause.31 The Supreme Court, somewhat reluctantly, decided in favor of the government32 
and conducted, in that single case, the last serious examination of state privilege in the American 
legal system.33 
Importantly, members of the family that raised the initial suit would later come to 
discover that the information, allegedly so detrimental to national security and so heavily relied 
upon by the government, was not so sensitive after all.34 Mr. Reynolds, upon whose death the 
above suit was based, had died in a mysterious plane crash.35 After the documents were 
declassified, it turned out that the B-29 in which he was flying was simply an accident-prone 
airplane, and that the engine had flamed out mid-flight.36 There were, in other words, no state 
secrets to protect—only liability to avoid. The shaky ground upon which state secrecy stands in 
the United States has very well predicted the quality of the dubiously “high-value” information 
that it has shielded for over sixty years. 
The McCarthyism of the 1940s and 1950s quickly seized on this newfound power, and 
                                                                  
26  See In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things no. BR 14-01, at 6 
(FISA Ct., Feb. 5, 2014). 
27  In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d 139, 143 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
28  26 KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & 
PROCEDURE EVID. § 5663 (2015) [hereinafter Privileges]. 
29  Id. 
30  United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1953). 
31  Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987, 989-90, 997 (3d Cir. 1951), rev’d 345 U.S. 1 (1953); see Barry 
Siegel, A Daughter Discovers What Really Happened, L.A. TIMES, (Apr. 19, 2004), http://articles.latimes.com/ 
2004/apr/19/nation/na-b29parttwo19. 
32  Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 6-7, 11-12. 
33  See generally Carrie Newton Lyons, The State Secrets Privilege: Expanding Its Scope Through 
Government Misuse, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 99 (2007). 
34  Privileges, supra note 28. 
35  Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 2. 
36  Privileges, supra note 28. 
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used it to its extremes.37 Freed from the responsibility to share its actions publicly, the FBI began 
to rampantly abuse its strategic capacities.38 The most well-studied aspect of these activities is the 
FBI’s COINTELPRO, or Counter Intelligence Program.39 Exposed by a break-in to an FBI field 
office in Pennsylvania,40 COINTELPRO was the heart of the Bureau’s “duty to do whatever [wa]s 
necessary to combat perceived threats to the existing social and political order.”41 The FBI 
engaged in surveillance and infiltration of groups advocating for social change;42 disseminated 
false information about various groups to discredit and sow animosity amongst them through 
regular media and planted agents;43 created and released documents purporting to come from 
various targeted groups that painted them and their ends in a negative light;44 fostered discord 
between various previously coordinating groups or within groups;45 used false arrest and 
testimony to displace and disorganize leadership and deplete group resources through legal 
battles;46 and was complicit in the organization of the assault and murder of prominent group 
                                                                  
37  Natsu Taylor Saito, Whose Liberty? Whose Security? The USA PATRIOT Act in the Context of 
COINTELPRO and the Unlawful Repression of Political Dissent, 81 OR. L. REV. 1051, 1078 (2002). 
38  Id. at 1079. 
39  Id. at 1060. 
40  Mark Mazzetti, Burglars Who Took On F.B.I. Abandon Shadows, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/07/us/burglars-who-took-on-fbi-abandon-shadows.html. 
41  Saito, supra note 37, at 1078-79; SENATE SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOV’T OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT 
TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, SUPPLEMENTAL DETAILED STAFF REPORTS ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS 
OF AMERICANS, S. REP. NO. 94-755, book III, at 3 (2d Sess. 1976) [hereinafter SENATE SELECT COMM.]. 
 Professor Saito provides an excellent and thorough background of oppression by and shadowy activities of 
government agents intent on disturbing movements for change. A fuller history may be obtained in that article, which 
provided invaluable background, and from which the authors drew heavily with respect to orientation and historical 
sources for this Article. 
42  The FBI intended to induce a state of paranoia and self-doubt, neatly summarized in J. Edgar Hoover’s 
famous desire that he wanted his targets believe there was “‘an FBI agent behind every mailbox.’” Saito, supra note 37, at 
1081-82. 
43  Id. at 1082. 
44  Id. Illustratively, the FBI commissioned a coloring book on behalf of the Black Panther Party that 
“promot[ed] racism and violence” and “mailed copies to companies which had been contributing food to the Panthers’ 
Breakfast for Children program to get them to withdraw their support.” Id. 
45  SENATE SELECT COMM., supra note 41, at 40. The report discussed COINTELPRO’s strategies for 
creating tension between groups:  
Approximately 28% of the Bureau’s COINTELPRO efforts were designed to weaken groups by 
setting members against each other, or to separate groups which might otherwise be allies, and 
convert them into mutual enemies. The techniques used included anonymous mailings (reprints, 
Bureau-authored articles and letters) to group members criticizing a leader or an allied group; using 
informants to raise controversial issues; forming a “notional”—a Bureau-run splinter group—to 
draw away membership from the target organization; encouraging hostility up to and including gang 
warfare, between rival groups; and the “snitch jacket” [(attribution of being a police informant)]. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
46  Saito, supra note 37, at 1084-85. One of the best examples includes:  
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol18/iss4/1
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leaders, regular members, and leaders’ families—including children as young as one year old.47 
Contemporary commentators have noted that “the Bureau set out to destroy black leaders simply 
because they were black leaders,” and at least one historian, David Garrow, has noted the 
“strongly conservative” bent of the FBI, its employees’ right-wing inclinations, and thus the 
influence that their political proclivities had on the Bureau’s political and operational stance.48 
The secrecy under which the FBI was able to operate fostered a concept of invincibility at the 
same time that, without a check on its exercise of power, encouraged abuses that would never 
have been considered, if the watchful eye of the public and press had been allowed to remain on 
them.49 
Since that time, many of the more egregious abuses have either subsided or not yet come 
to light.50 However, the American intelligence regime continues to suffer from a lack of 
definitional, operational, and oversight coherency.51 The Supreme Court has yet to fully define the 
                                                                  
Los Angeles [Black Panther Party (“BPP”)] leader Geronio ji Jaga (Pratt), who was the subject of 
constant surveillance and numerous failed attempts to convict him of various crimes. Finally, in 
1972, the government succeeded in convicting him of the 1968 “tennis court” murder of a woman in 
Santa Monica on the basis of the perjured testimony of an FBI informant, and despite the fact that 
the FBI, thanks to its surveillance, knew that Pratt had been 350 miles away at a BPP meeting in 
Oakland at the time of the murder. 
Id. at 1086. 
47  Id. at 1087-88.  
[T]he FBI provided direct support to the self-proclaimed “Guardians of the Oglala Nation” or 
“GOONS” on the Pine Ridge Reservation in South Dakota who have been implicated in the 
“unsolved” deaths of at least seventy individuals associated with [the American Indian Movement 
(“AIM”)] between 1972 and 1976. Particularly chilling is the fate of the family of John Trudell, 
AIM’s last national chairman:  
In February 1979, Trudell led a march in Washington, D.C. to draw attention to the difficulties 
the Indians were having. Although he had received a warning against speaking out, he 
delivered an address from the steps of the FBI building on the subject of the agency’s 
harassment of Indians . . . Less than 12 hours later, Trudell’s wife, Tina, his three children 
[ages five, three and one], and his wife’s mother were burned alive in the family home in 
Duck Valley, Nevada—the apparent work of an arsonist.  
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting WARD CHURCHILL & JIM VANDER WALL, AGENTS OF REPRESSION: THE FBI’S 
SECRET WARS AGAINST THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN MOVEMENT, 361 (2d ed. 2002) 
(quoting another source)). 
48  Paul Le Blanc, Revolutionary Road, Partial Victory: The March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom, 
65 MONTHLY REV. (Sept. 2013), http://monthlyreview.org/2013/09/01/revolutionary-road-partial-victory/. 
49  See generally PHILIP ZIMBARDO, STANFORD UNIV., THE STANFORD PRISON EXPERIMENT: A 
SIMULATION STUDY OF THE PSYCHOLOGY OF IMPRISONMENT CONDUCTED AUGUST 1971 AT STANFORD UNIVERSITY, 
available at http://web.stanford.edu/dept/spec_coll/uarch/exhibits/Narration.pdf (illustrating the meditative effects of 
watchful authority—and the extremes to which unsupervised people in positions of power can go). It is of particular note 
that overnight, when the persons playing the role of “guard” were under the impression they were not being watched, the 
abuses observed escalated immensely in both type and severity. See Ronald Hilton, US Soldiers’ Bad Behavior and 
Stanford Prison Experiment, WORLD ASS’N INT’L STUD., http://wais.stanford.edu/War/war_05152004.htm (last visited 
June 29, 2015). 
50  See Saito, supra note 37, at 1102-04. 
51  See generally Samuel J. Rascoff, Domesticating Intelligence, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 575, 588-604 (2010). 
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Constitution’s prohibitions on surveillance.52 Although confronted with the notion in at least two 
major cases,53 the Court has not determined whether electronic surveillance (now the vast 
majority of surveillance) “involving the national security” or “with respect to the activities of 
foreign powers, within or without this country,” is entitled to constitutional review.54 Although 
the latter failure of distinction seems innocent enough, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
(“FISA”) of 1978 defines an “agent of a foreign power”—who is not, as of yet, constitutionally 
protected—to be anyone who “acts for or on behalf of a foreign power which engages in 
clandestine activities in the United States contrary to the interests of the United States . . . .”55 
Again, this seems innocuous enough. But in practice, agents of foreign powers are defined to 
include both official representatives of a nation as well as any foreign terrorist organization, a 
U.S. citizen or permanent resident who has committed certain crimes, or (per the National 
Security Law Unit, the FBI’s non-criminal general counsel) any person not a citizen or permanent 
resident who has a connection with a foreign power.56 
Remarkably, the U.S. government is also allowed to deny that it is denying access to 
information. The Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) is the primary tool by which citizens and 
public organizations gain access to government information that would otherwise be kept from 
the public eye.57 The government is required to supply records responsive to citizen requests, with 
a certain number of exceptions. When invoking an exception, the government is nominally 
supposed to supply a description of the information withheld. However, even information 
regarding the withholding of documents may now be withheld.58 This leeway, magnified by the 
ability of the government to keep “national security” information a secret from nearly all parties 
(including persons under investigation), gives almost complete carte blanche to the FBI—and any 
other agency—to electronically surveil most people anywhere, at any time, with near 
unaccountability. 
Human intelligence—intelligence gathered by people who hear and see things 
themselves—provides the other primary inroad for surveilling agencies, and has already been 
exempted from First and Fourth Amendment protection.59 Since the days of Jimmy Hoffa, the 
                                                                  
52  See id. at 589-90. 
53  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 349 (1967); United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 
299 (1972). 
54  Rascoff, supra note 51, at 589-90. 
55  Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(1)(B) (2013).  
56  Michael P. Robotti, Grasping the Pendulum: Coordination Between Law Enforcement and Intelligence 
Officers Within the Department of Justice in a Post-“Wall” Era, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 751, 767 & n.125, 780 
(2009). 
57  See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)(A) (2013). 
58  ACLU of New Jersey v. FBI, 733 F.3d 526, 533-34 (3d Cir. 2013). In ACLU v. FBI, the Third Circuit 
denied a FOIA request for the release of FBI studies regarding the racial and ethnic characteristics of an area based on the 
claim that the release of such information “could ‘reasonably be expected to interfere with [law] enforcement 
proceedings,’” despite the prohibition on the use of race or ethnicity as a “‘dominant or primary factor’” in its 
investigations. Id. at 531-32. The court rejected as “implausible” that “only disclosure of a ‘dominant or primary factor’ 
could impede an FBI investigation,’” id. at 532, potentially opening a Pandora’s box of excuses for failing to comply with 
FOIA requests. 
59  Rascoff, supra note 51, at 591. 
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Supreme Court has found that, if you engage in speech that the government finds incriminating, 
you have forfeited your right to privacy (albeit circularly) because the government may be 
listening in.60 The potential criminality of acts discussed preemptively forfeits constitutional 
protection of their discussion. 
Oversight of government surveillance, already largely abdicated by the courts, is 
weakened further by the myriad of agencies that participate in the gathering of intelligence. The 
National Security Agency, the National Security Branch of the FBI, the Office of Intelligence and 
Analysis with the Department of Homeland Security, and the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence are among the seventeen different agencies and offices that make up the United States 
Intelligence Community.61 Although they meet to coordinate activities and information, each 
agency operates independently, and brings its own expertise and motives to the table. A number 
of these agencies are devoted to non-domestic work, which further complicates matters.62 Even 
sub-federal authorities, like the New York City Police Department (“NYPD”), now play a 
domestic intelligence role.63 
Beyond this, the bodies responsible for oversight of these agencies have fractured 
jurisdictions that fail to exercise effective power over most aspects of public surveillance and 
cannot provide a coherent picture of the scope of American domestic intelligence programs. No 
particular body is charged with oversight of intelligence as a whole. The Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court (“FISA Court”) only has an ex ante role in the determination of the sufficiency 
of an application for intelligence-gathering on a particular individual, group, or situation, and has 
no competency for follow-up with the investigation that results from its decision.64 On the other 
end of the continuum of investigation, civil suits are also difficult to bring: most people who have 
been surveilled have no idea that surveillance is happening; it is difficult to prove an injury to 
obtain standing; and the state secrets doctrine hamstrings any lawsuit before it can substantively 
begin.65 Even in Congress, where there is supposed to be active oversight in place, committees are 
weak; limited terms and purviews prevent the development of expertise in the field; investigations 
generally only occur where there has been a public issue raised already; oversight committees 
generally lack budgeting authority, which effectively declaws any enforcement strategy; and the 
committees are miniscule compared to, yet just as fractured as, the agencies they purport to 
oversee.66 Although pressure against these activities, a push for stronger regulations, and reduced 
                                                                  
60  Id. n.50 (citing United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 
(1966)). 
61  Id. at 593, 598 & n.84 (citing Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence: 
Structuring and Overseeing Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1655, 1662 (2006)); Our Strength Lies in 
Who We Are, INTELLIGENCE.GOV, http://www.intelligence.gov/mission/member-agencies.html (last visited June 29, 2015) 
(listing the seventeen U.S. agencies and offices that comprise the Intelligence Community). 
62  See Rascoff, supra note 51, at 593. 
63  Adam Goldman & Matt Apuzzo, Informant: NYPD Paid Me to “Bait” Muslims, ASSOCIATED PRESS 
(Oct. 23, 2012), http://www.ap.org/Content/AP-In-The-News/2012/Informant-NYPD-paid-me-to-bait-Muslims. 
64  Rascoff, supra note 51, at 594-95. The FISA Court, in 2007, denied only three of the more than 2,300 
warrant applications they were presented with which, although high, is “comparable to federal approval rates for search 
warrants more generally.” Id. at 595 n.70. 
65  Rascoff, supra note 51, at 596. 
66  Id. at 596-98. 
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informational accessibility is starting to build from within the government,67 the monitoring 
bodies themselves are not always immune from the very surveillance they are supposed to be 
regulating. This was recently evidenced by the highly publicized findings of the U.S. Central 
Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) Office of the Inspector General’s report, completed on July 18, 
2014, which found that CIA employees improperly accessed or caused access to Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence files and email.68 
Intelligence and surveillance practices that the United States Intelligence Community 
engages in are kept secret based on a dubious legal footing. This secrecy is compounded by the 
organization of intelligence services in the United States, which, as explained above, is fractured 
among seventeen different agencies and offices, with no central coordination or responsible 
body.69 Add to this the exceptions to public oversight; a rubberstamp warrant court with no 
follow-through authority; similarly confused and somewhat perpetually amateur toothless 
Congressional oversight; and a public unaware of and legally unable to redress the violations of 
its rights; and the result is an intelligence apparatus so fragmented and disorganized that it is 
nearly impossible to monitor or control. Without a tight rein, it is historically apparent that 
government intelligence agencies give in to some of their basest political and strategic desires, 
and engage in dubiously legal, and outright illegal, activity. 
III. MODERN SURVEILLANCE: SURVEILLANCE SINCE 9/11 
However disorganized it may be, the American surveillance regime is very effective at 
certain components of its job, regardless of their legality. The FBI and other agencies regularly 
map everyday activities, targeting ethnic communities and engaging in blatant, if sometimes 
seemingly innocent, racial profiling. Such programs invade the privacy of millions of Americans 
under no justifiable pretense. An examination of what the government looks for, and how it 
approaches the information it is seeking, can explain—though not excuse—the type of 
information they are currently gathering. 
The NYPD has been one of the more active domestic intelligence gathering services for 
which we have extensive information. In his complaint against the NYPD, Hamid Raza quotes the 
NYPD Radicalization Report’s admonition to monitor “[e]nclaves of ethnic populations that are 
largely Muslim [that] often serve as ‘ideological sanctuaries’ for the seeds of radical thought.”70 
Warning of the dangers posed by middle-class families, college students, unemployed persons, 
first, second, and third generation immigrants, alongside persons suspected of criminal conduct, 
the Radicalization Report notes that the NYPD watches “radicalization incubators”—mosques, 
“cafes, cab driver hangouts, flophouses, . . . student associations, nongovernmental organizations, 
                                                                  
67  See generally PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GROUP ON INTELLIGENCE AND COMMC’NS TECHS., LIBERTY AND 
SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD (2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2013-12-
12_rg_final_report.pdf. 
68  Summary of Report, CIA Office of Inspector General (July 31, 2014), available at http://images. 
politico.com/global/2014/07/31/cia-senateigrdisumm.pdf. 
69  See Rascoff, supra note 51, at 593, 598 & n.84 (citing Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Architecture of 
Smart Intelligence: Structuring and Overseeing Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1655, 1662 (2006)). 
70  Complaint at 5, Raza v. City of New York, 998 F. Supp. 2d 70 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 13 Civ. 3448) (first 
alteration in original). 
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hookah bars, butcher shops, and book stores.”71 Most egregiously, it identifies as “radicalization 
indicators” the wearing of traditional Islamic clothing, beard growth, alcohol abstention, and 
“becoming involved in social activism and community issues,”—all of which are First 
Amendment-protected activities, and none of which inherently indicate criminality or terroristic 
activity.72 Put another way, even if a person engaging in these activities was plotting a terrorist 
action, these activities themselves would not substantiate a conclusion, one way or another. The 
complaint also reveals that the NYPD engaged in mapping “ancestries of interest,” including 
twenty-eight different nationalities and regions in addition to “American Black Muslims.”73 
The FBI engages in similarly broad mapping of ethnic communities in Georgia. The 
ACLU of Georgia obtained FBI documents that revealed the mapping of various ethnic 
populations in Atlanta and the surrounding region, as well as the mundanity of the activities in 
which they are engaged that apparently warrant suspicion.74 The FBI was monitoring the “Black 
Separatist Threat” by noting rallies opposing the police killings of African Americans in Atlanta; 
noting dated eight-year-old information that a prominent Nation of Islam official had operated in 
Atlanta, and that “[i]n December 2001, . . . there [was] a strong alliance between the Crips and 
NBPP [the New Black Panther Party] in Atlanta”; and outlining the population percentages of 
African Americans through time and their projected growth in the future.75 Another document 
appears to track the activities and nationalities of students and others in technological businesses, 
noting the types of immigrants in Atlanta, recent census data, and various technical and scientific 
conferences in the area, concluding with a list of U.S. military installations in the Atlanta area.76 
Other documents reveal assessments of the numbers of foreign-born persons in Atlanta;77 
“moderate confidence” information about the existence of Hizballah in Atlanta, which 
presumably relies partly on demographic and census information for support;78 and an extensive 
look at the presence of persons of a variety of Latino nationalities, justified by the presence of 
some persons of those nationalities in the gang Mara Salvatrucha (“MS-13”)—also noting the use 
of deportation as an alternative means of threat elimination when information is insufficient to 
                                                                  
71  Id. at 5-6 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
72  Id. at 6. 
73  Id. The complaint listed the following countries and regions: “Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Bahrain, 
Bangladesh, Chechnya, Egypt, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Pakistan, Palestine, 
Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Yemen, and Yugoslavia,” 
and noted that “[a]ll but three of these countries or regions have majority Muslim populations. One of those remaining 
three countries—India—is home to eleven percent of the world’s Muslim population.” Id. 
74  Letter from David M. Hardy, Section Chief, Record and Information Dissemination Section, Records 
Management Division, FBI, to Azadeh Shahshahani (Dec. 22, 2010) (on file with author). Documents sent with this letter 
in response to Shahshahani’s FOIA request are hereinafter referred to as “2010 FOIA.” 
75  2010 FOIA, Document ACLURM011454 (Oct. 7, 2009), available at https://www.aclu.org/ 
files/fbimappingfoia/20111019/ACLURM011454.pdf. 
76  2010 FOIA, Document ACLURM011477 (Oct. 23, 2009) (noting that FBI Atlanta hosts a “monthly 
Counterintelligence Working Group (CIWG) and a quarterly Region 5 CIWG in which all USIC partners participate.”), 
available at aclu.org/files/fbimappingfoia/20111019/ACLURM011477.pdf. 
77  2010 FOIA, Document ACLURM011418 (May 11, 2009), available at http://www.aclu.org/ 
files/fbimappingfoia/20111019/ACLURM011418.pdf. 
78  2010 FOIA, Document ACLURM011403 (Jan. 30, 2009), available at http://www.aclu.org/ 
files/fbimappingfoia/20111019/ACLURM011403.pdf. 
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warrant criminal prosecution.79 These local assessments, coupled with similar assessments across 
the country,80 exhibit the blatant use of ethnic and demographic information as a primary 
component of domestic security threat assessments by the FBI. 
What is clear from the manner of these assessments is that investigations by the FBI are 
no longer performed based on criminal predicates, but rather ethnic and demographic 
characteristics of communities of color that have some stereotypical and unfounded social 
association with particular types of crime. This predictive assessment very closely resembles 
another scientific practice that presents a host of uncomfortable metaphorical conclusions: 
“disease surveillance” by epidemiologists.81 Epidemiologists study diseases within a population 
with the aim of curtailing their spread and eliminating their presence within that population. 
Broad-based public surveillance efforts, like epidemiological studies, collect large quantities of 
simple information on as many individuals within a community as possible to determine 
behavioral patterns that may lead to the discovery of the “disease path,” or the transmission of the 
pathogen to be eliminated—or in the case of public surveillance: potential terrorist threats.82 
Although dangers to personal privacy could be ameliorated by anonymizing the information 
gathered, the very presence of such “personal vectors” within the information available to an 
agency exposes individuals to severe threats to personal liberty should those gathering the 
information ever cease to self-monitor. Intelligence agencies are demonstrably vulnerable to this 
flaw, if past practice is any indicator. The FBI engages in these types of assessments under the 
name “domain management.”83 The goal of domain management is to acquire an understanding of 
the threats and vulnerabilities within a territory. Tellingly, such threats were sometimes initially 
assessed through analysis based partly on the hope that “sales records of Middle Eastern food 
would lead to Iranian terrorists.”84 
The U.S. domestic security apparatus, as part of the war-on-terror paradigm, seems to be 
stuck in a wartime footing that demands dramatic, extensive surveillance as part of the guarantee 
of American security.85 As is apparent from the FBI and NYPD investigations revealing the 
                                                                  
79  2010 FOIA, Documents ACLURM011388 (Dec. 15, 2008), available at http://www.aclu.org/ 
files/fbimappingfoia/20111019/ACLURM011388.pdf. 
80  ACLU Eye on the FBI: The FBI Is Engaged in Unconstitutional Racial Profiling and Racial “Mapping,” 
ACLU (Oct. 20, 2011), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/aclu_eye_on_the_fbi_alert_-_fbi_engaged 
_in_unconstitutional_racial_profiling_and_racial_mapping_0.pdf (“Without any evidence of actual wrongdoing and based 
on a generalized and entirely unsubstantiated threat assertion, the Detroit FBI sought to collect information about Middle-
Eastern and Muslim communities in Michigan.”). In addition, Russian and Chinese populations in San Francisco were 
similarly targeted because they were of significant size and there has “been organized crime [within this community] for 
generations.” Id. Furthermore, the investigations into MS-13 in Georgia were duplicated in at least Alabama and New 
Jersey. Id. 
81  Rascoff, supra note 51, at 605-13. 
82  See id. at 610-11. 




84  Jeff Stein, FBI Hoped to Follow Falafel Trail to Iranian Terrorists Here, CONG. Q. HOMELAND SEC., 
Nov. 2, 2007, available at Westlaw 2007 WLNR 21995390. 
85  Victor Bascara, Cultural Politics of Redress: Reassessing the Meaning of the Civil Liberties Act of 1988 
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targeting of ethnic, national, and religious communities, there have been significant recent trends 
in investigation correlating criminality with certain ethnic characteristics. Profiling has occurred 
not merely because a racial, ethnic, national, or religious characteristic has been used to identify a 
target for surveillance, but rather because those characteristics have been used as substitutes for 
individualized investigation into, or particularized information about, the potential for criminality 
within a particular group or of individual persons. Thus, race is being used as a signal of 
criminality, not a descriptor of an individual.86 
Discrimination and discriminatory legal wrangling is no stranger to the American scene. 
From the expulsion of Native American tribes in violation of treaty obligations, to the three-fifths 
clause of our Constitution, to internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II, the U.S. 
government has taken sweeping actions to “secure” this country for its nominally (and 
inconsistently) “white”87 citizenry to the detriment of people of color and immigrants. Modern 
expressions of these tactics have manifested in discriminatory enforcement against, and searches 
of, populations of people of color and immigrants (in spite of the fact that actual drug possession 
rates do not significantly differ between races88 and rates of usage for some drugs are twice as 
high for Caucasians as they are for non-Caucasian populations89), disproportionate arrest90 and 
imprisonment of people of color and immigrants,91 and now the targeting of ethnic and religious 
minority populations for surveillance and control. 
Discrimination is also part of law enforcement outside of the security realm, particularly 
in the field of immigration. People from certain nations have been targeted for intensified 
identification measures, “voluntary” interviewing, discriminatory deportation, and baseless 
detention.92 During the ambit of the National Security Entry/Exit Registration System, immigrants 
from Muslim and Arab countries experienced an increase in deportation that was nearly ten times 
                                                                  
after 9/11, 10 ASIAN L.J. 185, 185-86 (2003) (noting the hysteria that surrounded the treatment of Americans—both 
citizens and immigrants—who shared the nationality of a country with which the United States was at war and their 
treatment, including years of internment, deprivation of property and disruption of lives in every way possible, in the 
pursuit of American security). 
86  Deborah A. Ramirez, Jennifer Hoopes & Tara Lai Quinlan, Defining Racial Profiling in a Post-
September 11 World, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1195, 1210-17 (2003). 
87  See Sam Roberts, A Nation of None and All of the Above, N.Y. TIMES, (Aug. 16, 2008), 
nytimes.com/2008/08/17/weekinreview/17roberts.html?_r=0 (discussing how the definition of “white” in America has 
been adapted through time). 
88  Ramirez, Hoopes & Quinlan, supra note 86, at 1211-12. 
89  See List of Available Quick Tables for the National Survey on Drug Use and Health, 2011, SUBSTANCE 
ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/quicktables/quickconfig.do?34481-0001_all 
(providing links to create tables based on drug use and respondent characteristics of users, including race and ethnicity). 
90  Jamie Fellner, Race, Drugs and Law Enforcement in the United States, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 257, 
271-72 (2009) (noting that in the United States, blacks were arrested at 3.5 to 3.9 times the rate of whites in recent years, 
and at five times the rate of whites from 1988 to 1993). 
91  HEATHER C. WEST, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISON INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2009—STATISTICAL TABLES 
2 (2010), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pim09st.pdf (finding that black males are incarcerated at six 
times the rate of white males). 
92  See B.J. Smith, Emma Lazarus Weeps: State-Based Anti-Immigration Initiatives and the Federalism 
Challenge, 80 UMKC L. REV. 905, 915 (2012). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2015
INDISCRIMINATE POWER - FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/24/15  1:34 PM 
296 UNIV. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE [Vol. 18.4 
the average increase for immigrants from other countries.93 Laws that permit law enforcement 
officers to detain suspected undocumented residents on a “reasonable suspicion” allow for 
extended detention of members of the public not accused of criminal activity.94 “Show-me-your-
papers” laws that require documentation of immigration status impose significant burdens on 
many immigrants and interfere with national uniformity of immigration systems.95 Some states 
have even enacted laws that allow police officers to arrest an individual on “the probable belief 
that a person has committed a public offense that makes him or her removable from the United 
States.”96 Removability determinations require due process, and are difficult for many 
experienced decision makers to handle, let alone untrained police officers without the necessary 
legal knowledge. Such statutory provisions serve as little more than a pretext to profile and harass 
immigrants and people of color. 
IV. FBI GUIDELINES 
Attorney General Edward Levi first devised an internal protocol97 (known as the “Levi 
Guidelines”) for FBI domestic security investigations in 1976 in response to public criticism.98 
Allison Jones articulates the reasons for the criticism: 
Attorney General Levi created the FBI guidelines to protect the liberties of U.S. 
citizens from the internal, domestic threats of President Nixon’s abuses of 
power. The executive power, extended to the Attorney General and the FBI by 
law, allowed President Nixon’s and previous administrations to conduct at-will 
and without predicate the kinds of investigations typically applied to suspects of 
criminal activity for the purpose of indictment. The FBI did not implement a 
formal court process, nor was there any set of rules governing the FBI’s 
requirement to establish probable cause before commencing an investigation. 
Under these practices, the abuses later uncovered by Attorney General Levi and 
the investigatory committees appointed by Congress included: secret 
surveillance of individuals opposing the Vietnam War; more than 500,000 files 
on domestic groups and U.S. citizens of all religions, beliefs, and political 
affiliations; and most infamously, the compilation of intelligence information 
and the surveillance of the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People (NAACP) and civil rights activists like Martin Luther King, Jr., 
                                                                  
93  Id. 
94  Id. at 923. 
95  See id. at 924-25. 
96  Id. at 933-34. 
97  Letter from Edward H. Levi, Attorney General, to FBI Director Clarence M. Kelly (Nov. 4, 1976), 
reprinted in FBI Statutory Charter: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., pt. 1, 18, 20-26 (1978) 
[hereinafter Levi Guidelines]. 
98  Shirin Sinnar, Questioning Law Enforcement: The First Amendment and Counterterrorism Interviews, 77 
BROOK. L. REV. 41, 58 (2011). 
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whom the FBI targeted because he might “abandon his supposed ‘obedience to 
white liberal doctrines.”‘99 
The Levi Guidelines called for a factual basis for initiating investigations and for 
additional requirements if the investigation progressed further.100 Under the Levi Guidelines, 
agents of the Bureau could launch preliminary investigations only if they possessed information 
that indicated activities which could be violent or “which involve or will involve the violation of 
federal law.”101 Preliminary investigations could last only ninety days.102 If the allegations had no 
factual basis, as determined by a limited review of public records and interviews, they were to be 
dropped.103 Full investigations had to be predicated on “articulable facts giving reason to believe” 
that a person or group was engaging in activities that violate federal law.104 Techniques such as 
electronic surveillance, informant recruitment, appearances at demonstrations or meetings,105 and 
“mail covers”106 could only be used during full investigations.107 
Former Attorney General Michael Mukasey issued a revised version of the guidelines in 
2008.108 The revisions, which represented the “weakest version” ever issued by an Attorney 
General, afforded the FBI unprecedented discretion.109 The Mukasey Guidelines continued the 
trajectory that began after 9/11: “[p]urported ‘national security’ initiatives continue to trump the 
individual rights of U.S. citizens.”110 The Mukasey Guidelines afford FBI agents discretion to 
conduct interviews that extend far beyond those allowed under the Levi Guidelines.111 The 
Mukasey guidelines opened the door to “a standard that could conceivably justify interviews 
initiated to inquire into the religious or political”112 motivations whenever “the circumstances 
                                                                  
99  Jones, supra note 1. 
100  Levi Guidelines, supra note 97, at 21-22. 
101  Id. at 20-21. 
102  Id. at 22. 
103  See id. at 60-61. 
104  Id. at 22. 
105  The FBI agents’ attendance of public meetings has a chilling effect on free speech. See generally Gayle 
Horn, Online Searches and Offline Challenges: The Chilling Effect, Anonymity and the New FBI Guidelines, 60 N.Y.U. 
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 735 (2005) (evaluating the chilling effect from new internet provisions in the FBI Guidelines on 
General Crimes). 
106  Through the mail covers system, law enforcement requests that the United States Postal Service record 
information from the outside of letters and parcels before delivery and send the information to the requesting agency. Ron 
Nixon, U.S. Postal Service Logging All Mail for Law Enforcement, N.Y. TIMES, (July 3, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2013/07/04/us/monitoring-of-snail-mail.html. 
107  Jones, supra note 1, at 142. 
108  ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES FOR DOMESTIC FBI OPERATIONS (2008) [hereinafter MUKASEY 
GUIDELINES], available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2008/10/03/guidelines.pdf. 
109  Sinnar, supra note 98, at 58. 
110  Jones, supra note 1, at 165. 
111  See Sinnar, supra note 98, at 59.  
112  Id. 
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warrant.”113 Moreover, the Mukasey Guidelines do nothing to mitigate potential First Amendment 
violations.114 
Former Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr. has released his revisions to the 
guidelines.115 The proposed guidelines expand prohibited profiling to include “religion, national 
origin, gender and sexual orientation.”116 These prohibited categories would be functionally 
equivalent to the prohibition on racial profiling. The guidelines raise the standard that agents are 
required to meet before considering these factors: “unless there is specific, credible information 
that makes race relevant to a case,” it must be ignored.117 According to Hina Shamsi, an attorney 
with the ACLU, “Putting an end to [religious profiling] not only comports with the Constitution, 
it would put real teeth to the F.B.I.’s claims that it wants better relationships with religious 
minorities.”118 
The revised guidelines do however, allow the FBI to map ethnic populations and use that 
information “to recruit informants and open investigations.”119 Furthermore, the guidelines do 
“not apply to interdiction activities in the vicinity of the border,”120 and thus provide tacit 
approval to the FBI, the Transportation Security Administration (“TSA”), and Customs and 
Border Protection (“CBP”) to engage in profiling within the “vicinity” of the border. The 
“vicinity” of the border is understood to reach 100 miles from any external land or sea boundary, 
as well as airports and seaports that are located on inland waterways.121 The guidelines further do 
not cover state and local enforcement. While the guidelines cover some joint federal and local law 
enforcement activities,122 a nationwide ban on unconstitutional practices is sorely needed. 
                                                                  
113  See MUKASEY GUIDELINES, supra note 108, at 16 (2008). 
114  Sinnar, supra note 98, at 59. 
115  Matt Apuzzo, Profiling Rules Said to Give F.B.I. Tactical Leeway, N.Y. TIMES, (Apr. 9, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/10/us/profiling-rules-said-to-give-fbi-tactical-leeway.html. See also Sari Horwitz, 
Justice Dept. Announces New Rules to Curb Racial Profiling by Federal Law Enforcement, WASH. POST (Dec. 8, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/justice-dept-to-announce-new-rules-to-curb-racial-profiling-by-
federal-law-enforcement/2014/12/07/e00eca18-7e79-11e4-9f38-95a187e4c1f7_story.html. 
116  Apuzzo, supra note 115. 
117  Matt Apuzzo, U.S. to Expand Rules Limiting Use of Profiling by Federal Agents (Jan. 15, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/16/us/politics/us-to-expand-rules-limiting-use-of-profiling-by-federal-agents.html. See 
also Sinnar, supra note 98, at 59.  
118  Apuzzo, supra note 117. 
119  Apuzzo, supra note 115. See also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUIDANCE FOR FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 
AGENCIES REGARDING THE USE OF RACE, ETHNICITY, GENDER, NATIONAL ORIGIN, RELIGION, SEXUAL ORIENTATION, OR 
GENDER IDENTITY 8 (2014) [hereinafter 2014 GUIDANCE], available at http://www.justice.gov/ 
sites/default/files/ag/pages/attachments/2014/12/08/use-of-race-policy.pdf. 
120  2014 GUIDANCE, supra note 119, at 2 n.2. 
121  See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3) (2012); 8 C.F.R. § 287.1(b) (2015). See also Customs and Border Protection’s 
(CBP’s) 100-Mile Rule, ACLU, http://legalactioncenter.org/sites/default/files/CBP%20100%20Mile%20Rule.pdf (last 
visited June 29, 2015). 
122  2014 GUIDANCE, supra note 119, at 1. 
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V. IMPACT OF PROFILING ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
Racial profiling is the targeting of individuals based on individuals’ “race, ethnicity, 
religion or national origin.”123 Racial profiling in the United States continues to occur, such as 
stopping people of color for minor traffic violations (often referred to as “driving while black or 
brown”).124 In New York City, the police department’s “stop and frisk” practices provide another 
current example of racial profiling.125 
These examples reflect the continued tension between police power and the Fourth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution.126 The Fourth Amendment “guarantees all people 
the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and specifies that probable cause 
must exist before the issuance of a warrant.”127 If the facts and circumstances before the officer 
are sufficient “to warrant a man of reasonable caution in . . . belie[ving] that an offense has 
been . . . committed,’ there is probable cause.”128 Probable cause “indicates that a crime likely has 
occurred rather than might have occurred.”129 Law enforcement must “possess fact-based 
particularized suspicion before they search or seize a person or property.”130 The search or seizure 
is often carried “through an official warrant, describing the place to be searched or the thing to be 
seized.”131 At a minimum, however, officers cannot stop someone without some facts that justify 
them in doing so.132 
Police investigatory stops of both pedestrians and motorists—commonly known as Terry 
stops—must be based on specific, individualized, and articulable facts indicating that criminal or 
illegal activity might be taking place.133 “This suspicion must be based on specific facts known to 
the officer, in light of the totality of the circumstances, and cannot stem from a mere hunch or 
subjective bias . . . .”134 If reasonable suspicion exists, an officer can perform a Terry stop, ask the 
                                                                  
123  ACLU, Racial Profiling: Definition, http://www.aclu.org/racial-justice/racial-profiling-definition/ (last 
visited June 29, 2015). 
124  Id. 
125  See ELIOT SPITZER, CIVIL RIGHTS BUREAU, THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT’S “STOP & 
FRISK” PRACTICES: A REPORT TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK FROM THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY 
GENERAL (1999), available at http://purl.org/net/nysl/nysdocs/43037966. 
126  See Azadeh Shahshahani, Immigration and Racial Profiling, in CULTURAL ISSUES IN CRIMINAL 
DEFENSE 477, 478-79 (Linda Friedman Ramirez ed., 3d ed. 2010). 
127  Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
128  Safford Unified School Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 370 (2009) (quoting Brinegar v. United 
States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Shahshahani, supra note 126, at 479. 
129  Shahshahani, supra note 126, at 479; ACLU, THE PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL PROFILING IN GWINETT: 
TIME FOR ACCOUNTABILITY, TRANSPARENCY, AND AN END TO 287(G), at 18 (Azadeh Shahshahani ed., 2010), available at 
http://www.acluga.org/download_file/view_inline/1504/392/ (citing Safford, 129 U.S. at 2639). 
130  Morgan Cloud, Quakers, Slaves and the Founders: Profiling to Save the Union, 73 MISS. L.J. 369, 369 
(2003). 
131  Shahshahani, supra note 126, at 479 (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980)). 
132  Id.; ACLU, supra note 129. 
133  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).  
134  Shahshahani, supra note 126, at 479; ACLU, supra note 129; see Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22. 
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individual to identify him or herself, and ask what he or she is doing.135 A Terry stop is different 
than a full police encounter and, from a constitutional perspective, requires no probable cause 
because the scope of the police’s potential intrusion is curtailed.136 “[W]ith probable cause, the 
officer can seize and arrest the individual. . . . [and] if after the stop[] there is no information 
leading to probable cause, the officer must let the [individual] go.”137 
“It is clear from these constitutional standards that an officer must possess at least some 
information indicating criminal or illegal activity in order to stop an individual, and even more 
information[—‘probable cause’—]to make an arrest.”138 While the definitional standard is fuzzy, 
probable cause is less than a “preponderance of the evidence,” which requires at least half of the 
evidence plus one to be found in favor of the moving party, but more than “reasonable suspicion,” 
which is required to justify a temporary investigative detention. 
As Azadeh Shahshahani—one of the authors of this Article—has maintained, these 
standards illustrate “exactly why racial profiling is problematic from a legal standpoint.”139 
Because “[n]o logical relationship exists between [racial] characteristics and the commission of 
crimes,”140 without other information, officers who conduct stops or make arrests based solely on 
an individual’s race or ethnicity do not have probable cause or reasonable suspicion.141 
Profiling based on certain forms of expression can chill free speech rights when it 
effectively becomes a proxy for racial or religious profiling: 
The harms associated with First Amendment profiling mirror those arising from 
explicit racial or religious profiling. Where a form of expression is strongly 
linked to one’s ethnicity, national origin, or religion, government selection of 
individuals for special scrutiny on account of their expression will “feel” the 
same as targeting members of that racial or religious group directly.142 
Professor Frank Cooper argues that identity—and thus, to a degree, one’s personality—is 
composed of both an internal and an external component.143 Since what you do is the only 
representative aspect of who you are, and your identity is to some extent constrained by what it is 
that you can do, social limitations on your ability to act or speak in certain ways constrain the 
parameters within which you can construct your identity.144 Put differently, if you feel as though 
you cannot act, speak, or associate for fear of surveillance or prosecution, you will avoid those 
means of self-expression and—due to the social pressure constructing that constraint—your 
personality will actually be altered. Fear of surveillance creates changes in behavioral patterns 
                                                                  
135  United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989).  
136  Id.; Terry, 392 U.S. at 25-26. 
137  Shahshahani, supra note 126, at 479 (footnote omitted); ACLU, supra note 129. 
138  Id. 
139  Shahshahani, supra note 126, at 480. 
140  Cloud, supra note 130, at 370.  
141  Shahshahani, supra note 126, at 480; ACLU, supra note 129, at 18-19. 
142  Sinnar, supra note 98, at 65 (footnote omitted).  
143  Cooper, supra note 24, at 536-38. 
144  Id. 
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that force conformity with status quo personal and political identities.145 
VI. COURT CHALLENGES 
Some court rulings have curbed the government’s unbridled surveillance. In two class 
action cases in particular, plaintiffs had claimed that the City of Chicago’s police department and 
the FBI had conducted surveillance of plaintiffs’ lawful activities and had gathered the 
information by unlawful means.146 Unified in Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, the 
decision evaluated whether the settlement reached by the two actions was equitable.147 The 
resulting consent decrees erected strict limitations on how police could conduct surveillance of 
political activity.148 The decrees stipulated that the City of Chicago would not conduct 
investigations solely on the basis of activities protected by the First Amendment and would only 
target conduct forbidden by criminal law.149 Decided in 1982 by Judge Getzendanner, the district 
court held that the two parties’ submission of proposed settlement agreements to the court 
provided plaintiffs with injunctive relief and was “fair, reasonable, and appropriate.”150 
In 1986, in Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney General of the United States, the 
Socialist Workers Party alleged wrongdoing by the FBI, including electronic surveillance after the 
Attorney General classified the party as a subversive organization according to Section V.2.f of 
Executive Order 9835.151 The court found these activities to be violations of the Socialist Workers 
Party’s constitutional rights.152 The court went further and awarded the Socialist Workers Party 
$42,500 for disruptive activities by the FBI, $96,500 for surreptitious entries, and $125,000 for 
the FBI’s use of informants, for a complete recovery of $264,000.153 
Decided in 2003, Handschu v. Special Services Division154 was the culmination of a 
prolonged legal challenge to the maintenance of dossiers on political activists and the use of 
various undercover and surveillance techniques to monitor the activities of political organizations 
and individuals in New York City.155 A consent decree was entered into in 1985.156 Among its 
                                                                  
145  Id. 
146  Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 561 F. Supp. 537, 539-40 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (filed as 
Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, No. 74 C 3268 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 13, 1974), and ACLU v. City of Chicago, 
No. 75 C 3295 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 1975)). 
147  See generally id. 
148  See id. at 560-71. 
149  Id. at 562-64. 
150  Id. at 555. 
151  Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 642 F. Supp. 1357, 1363, 1396. (S.D.N.Y. 1986). 
Executive Order 9835 established the Employee Loyalty Program for civilian employees in the executive branch. Id. at 
1396. 
152  Id. at 1364. 
153  Id. at 1432. 
154  Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 273 F. Supp. 2d 327 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
155  See Handschu v. Special Services Division (Challenging NYPD Surveillance Practices Targeting 
Political Groups), NYCLU, http://www.nyclu.org/case/handschu-v-special-services-division-challenging-nypd-
surveillance-practices-targeting-politica (last visited June 29, 2015). 
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stipulations was a requirement that the NYPD would be prevented from investigating 
organizations unless there was “specific information” that the organization was intending to 
commit a crime or that it had committed a crime.157 Most prominently, the decree also established 
a system of recordkeeping and procedures for approval of investigations by a three-member body, 
called the Handschu Authority.158 
Despite these judicial constraints, other cases have allowed government surveillance to 
continue or expand. In 1982, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, led by 
Circuit Judge Harry T. Edwards, held that federal agencies, including the FBI, could withhold 
certain investigatory information—including how suspects are surveilled—even though the 
methods used by the FBI may have been improper, as long as the information was created in the 
pursuit of a law enforcement purpose.159 As a result, the court did not distinguish the FBI’s 
documents on its program against “black nationalist groups,” which listed the goals of 
“prevent[ing] militant black nationalist groups and leaders from gaining respectability by 
discrediting them,” from other documents with law enforcement purpose.160 
In 1986, in López-Pacheco v. United States, the plaintiff claimed that he was injured as a 
result of FBI surveillance activity.161 The court dismissed the case, holding that the FBI’s 
activities were of the nature and quality that Congress had shielded from tort liability in the 
“discretionary function” exception to the Federal Torts Claim Act.162 
Other court challenges are currently pending. In 2013, the ACLU filed a complaint 
against the NYPD on behalf of Hamid Hassan Raza and several members of New York’s Muslim 
community.163 The Raza complaint accused the NYPD of “engag[ing] in an unlawful policy and 
practice of religious profiling and suspicionless surveillance of Muslim New Yorkers” since 
2002.164 The complaint maintained that the policy, in theory and practice, targeted Muslims with 
the justification that their “religious belief and practices are a basis for law enforcement 
scrutiny.”165 For example, in the 2007 NYPD Intelligence Division report titled Radicalization in 
the West: The Homegrown Threat, the NYPD identified a discrete “radicalization process” where 
certain, constitutionally protected expressions of religious belief, such as “wearing traditional 
Islamic clothing” and “becoming involved in social activism,” are justifying factors in 
surveillance.166 In a similar action, Hassan v. City of New York,167 a group of Muslims from New 
                                                                  
156  Id. at 331. 
157  Id. at 331-32. 
158  Id.; Handschu v. Special Services Division (Challenging NYPD Surveillance Practices Targeting 
Political Groups), supra note 155. 
159  Pratt v. Webster, 673 F.2d 408, 423-25 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
160  Id. at 422.  
161  López-Pacheco v. United States, 627 F. Supp. 1224, 1225 (D.P.R. 1986). 
162  Id. at 1229-31. 
163  Complaint, Raza v. City of New York, No. 1:13-CV-03448 (E.D.N.Y. June 18, 2013), available at 
https://www.aclu.org/national-security/raza-v-city-new-york-complaint. 
164  Id. at 1. 
165  Id. 
166  MITCHELL D. SILBER & ARVIN BHATT, INTELLIGENCE DIV., NYPD, RADICALIZATION IN THE WEST: 
THE HOMEGROWN THREAT 21, 33 (2007), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/public_information/ 
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Jersey represented by Muslim Advocates and the Center for Constitutional Rights challenged the 
NYPD’s discriminatory spying program targeting American Muslims. In February 2014, Judge 
William J. Martini ruled that if the plaintiffs were harmed by the NYPD surveillance, it was a 
result of the reporting by the Associated Press rather than as a consequence of the secret 
practice.168 The decision was appealed following the district court’s dismissal.169 
In sum, these cases have established most investigatory practices as beyond practical 
restraint; even where they remain illegal, they are made legally invisible and thus uncontrollable 
by the courts. 
As former ACLU national staff counsel and CEO of the JFK Library Foundation John 
H.F. Shattuck has noted, “[p]olitical surveillance . . . has a long and troubled history in the United 
States.”170 This history is not about to get any brighter. For instance, instead of discussing 
modification with class counsel, the NYPD moved for an order modifying the Handschu 
Guidelines under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) to significantly relax the restrictions 
placed on the NYPD.171 Judge Charles Sherman Haight, Jr. granted many of the NYPD’s 
requested modifications.172 Judge Haight found significant factual changes since the Guidelines 
were enacted, noting that “[t]here is no disputing Deputy Commissioner Cohen’s assertion that 
since the formulation of the Handschu Guidelines in 1985, ‘[t]he world has undergone remarkable 
changes[] . . . in terms of new threats we face.’”173 That the longstanding Handschu lawsuit 
continues to this day, forty-four years after its inception, is sobering.174 
Such “remarkable changes” will also be the calling card of surveillance that views civil 
                                                                  
NYPD_Report-Radicalization_in_the_West.pdf. 
167  Hassan v. City of New York, No. 2:12-3401, 2014 WL 654604 (D.N.J. Feb. 20, 2014), appeal filed, No. 
14-1688 (3d Cir. Mar. 24, 2014). 
168  Hassan v. City of New York, No. 2:12-3401, 2014 WL 654604, *4 (D.N.J. Feb. 20, 2014). 
169  See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellants, Hassan v. City of New York, No. 14-1688-cv, (3d Cir. Jul. 3, 2014), 
available at http://ccrjustice.org/files/7-3-14%20Plaintiffs'%20Appeal%20Brief%20-%20Hassan.pdf. 
170  John H.F. Shattuck, Tilting at the Surveillance Apparatus, 1 C.L. REV. 59, 59 (1974). 
171  See Handschu, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 329. The resulting order granted alterations from the Guidelines of the 
1985 Handschu Decree in the following respect: under the 1985 Decree, an investigation must have met the substantive 
threshold of “specific information” that a crime had been or was about to be committed. Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 
605 F. Supp. 1384, 1421 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). Under the modified Handschu Guidelines, which incorporated the FBI 
Guidelines, a preliminary inquiry can be initiated when there is “information . . . which indicates the possibility of criminal 
activity.” Handschu, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 346 (quoting ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES ON GENERAL CRIMES, 
RACKETEERING ENTERPRISE AND TERRORISM ENTERPRISE INVESTIGATIONS 1 (2002), available at http://fas.org/irp/ 
agency/doj/fbi/generalcrimes2.pdf) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also MUKASEY GUIDELINES, supra note 108, at 
18.  
172  Handschu, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 349. 
173  Id. at 337 (quoting Declaration of David Cohen, at ¶ 7 (Sept. 12, 2002)) (second alteration in original). 
174  See, e.g., Handschu v. Special Services Div., No. 71 Civ. 2203(CSH), 2014 WL 407103 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 
30, 2014) (noting unsettled disputes between the parties); Handschu v. Police Dep’t of City of New York, 905 F. Supp. 2d 
555 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (attempting to resolve dispute over a previous court order); Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 475 F. 
Supp. 2d 331, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“There will be a Handschu class action and a judge of this Court in charge of it for it 
as long as New York City stands . . . .”), vacated, No. 71 Civ. 2203, 2007 WL 1711775, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 13, 2007) 
(noting the case arose from an action filed in 1971).  
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liberties as obstacles to be overcome rather than respected. There is no doubt that police 
surveillance of constitutionally protected First Amendment activity will continue into the 
foreseeable future. The scope of the substantive changes to the Handschu Guidelines is still being 
litigated, though this battle is a mere microcosm of the larger struggle being waged to define the 
parameters of constitutional protection. It will likely be years before we can adequately assess the 
effect of the favorable legal decisions above on civil liberties in an era defined by September 11, 
2001. Yet we can safely acknowledge that, despite these successes, recent trends show increased 
pressure to curtail civil liberties under the aegis of counter-terrorism and counter-intelligence. 
VII. RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The war on terror has served as pretext for increasing surveillance on American citizens, 
based on racial, ethnic, religious, or other status grounds. Racial, ethnic, religious, and political 
profiling is not only counter to U.S. law and internal Department of Justice directives, but it also 
contravenes principles of international law. 
The United Nations provides extensive recommendations and guidelines on privacy and 
racial discrimination.175 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”) is one such 
document that establishes a basis for understanding the right to privacy.176 UDHR Article 12 
states: “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or 
correspondence. . . .”177 The rights in the UDHR are to be protected and provided for all persons 
regardless of race, religion, political association, or other similar status.178 Although Article 17.1 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) reads similar to UDHR 
Article 12,179 ICCPR Article 4 provides some clarification regarding derogation of rights, stating 
that, in times of emergency, states “may take measures derogating from their obligations” insofar 
as such measures are consistent with other obligations and “do not involve discrimination solely 
on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin.”180 The difficulty in the 
                                                                  
175  Non-governmental organizations also provide guidance. See generally Open Soc’y Justice Initiative et 
al., The Global Principles on National Security and the Right to Information (Tshwane Principles), ACLU (2013), 
https://www.aclu.org/human-rights/global-principles-national-security-and-right-information-tshwane-principles 
[hereinafter Global Principles on National Security].  
176  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 
1948). The UDHR was drafted as a result of the experience of the Second World War and served to complement the UN 
Charter with a way to guarantee the rights of individuals. It is considered a foundational document for international human 
rights law. 
177  Id. art. 12 (“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or 
correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against 
such interference or attacks.”). 
178  Id. art. 2 (“Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without 
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status.”). 
179  See id. art. 12; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 17, opened for signature Dec. 
19. 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 177 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) (“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful 
interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation.”), 
available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20999/v999.pdf. 
180  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 179, art. 4, at 174. 
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United States is that government officials continually subvert international obligations due to 
perceived “national security” prerogatives on constitutionally dubious, if nominally legal, 
grounds.181 The new FBI guidelines will still allow these subversions as they do not apply to all 
government agencies, including but not limited to the TSA and the CBP.182 Even in times of war, 
however, status discrimination is always outside of a government’s permitted tool set. 
Aside from violating the rights to privacy, current monitoring practices are founded on 
the profiling of potential suspects based on racial, ethnic, religious, and other status grounds. The 
International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (“CERD”) sets clear 
guidelines and recommendations regarding state actions and policies that may rely on racial 
distinctions.183 The CERD defines “racial discrimination” as: 
any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, 
descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of 
nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal 
footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, 
social, cultural or any other field of public life.184 
As parties to this treaty, states agree to the definitions therein, and also agree to review 
governmental policies, and to amend or rescind those that perpetuate racial discrimination.185 
Despite this requirement, the United States has expanded surveillance and intelligence powers and 
authorizations clearly targeting people based on racial, ethnic, religious, or other status grounds. 
VIII. PRIVACY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Although the right to privacy is not as absolute as freedom from status discrimination, 
limitations on privacy are only justified in accord with the provisions and objectives of the 
ICCPR. In Toonen v. Australia, the United Nations Human Rights Committee, the body that 
monitors the implementation of the ICCPR, explained that it “interprets the requirement of 
reasonableness [in ICCPR article 17] to imply that any interference with privacy must be 
                                                                  
181  International treaties are not self-executing in the United States; they must be approved by Congress and 
ratified by the President to be executed into law. MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND AGREEMENTS: 
THEIR EFFECT UPON U.S. LAW 2-3 (2015), available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32528.pdf. In addition, via 
ratification, countries have the opportunity to place reservations or understandings on the treaties, which can alter the 
extent of obligations. Id. at 3. This means that quite often, treaties can be manipulated so that they are effectively null, 
even post ratification. See id. 
182  ACLU Response to Revised DOJ Guidance on the Use of Race by Federal Law Enforcement Agencies, 
ACLU (Dec. 8, 2014), https://www.aclu.org/criminal-law-reform-racial-justice/aclu-response-revised-doj-guidance-use-
race-federal-law-enforceme. 
183  International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for 
signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 212.  
184  Id. art. 1, at 216. 
185  Id. art. 2, at 218 (“Each State Party shall take effective measures to review governmental, national and 
local policies, and to amend, rescind or nullify any laws and regulations which have the effect of creating or perpetuating 
racial discrimination wherever it exists; . . . .”). 
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proportional to the end sought and be necessary in the circumstances of any given case.”186 In the 
case of surveillance, one would need to determine whether perpetual monitoring is necessary and 
proportionate to the end sought. The end in this case is threat assessment and, should a threat be 
discovered, attempts at prevention. In the case of perpetual monitoring, the scope is shockingly 
broad.187 These means are simply not necessary or proportional to achieve the desired outcome. 
Outside of treaties, the international community has crafted a significant number of 
guidelines regarding privacy and surveillance. More specifically, the United Nations has taken a 
leading role in defining the right to privacy in the digital age, particularly given the special 
vulnerabilities of electronic communications and digital identities.188 The discussion surrounding 
the right to privacy in the digital age began with a resolution in which the United Nations General 
Assembly expressed concern about the impact that surveillance has on human rights and affirmed 
that rights must be protected in online formats just as in real life.189 The General Assembly also 
called upon states to: 
review their procedures, practices and legislation regarding the surveillance of 
communications, their interception and the collection of personal data, 
including mass surveillance, interception and collection, with a view to 
                                                                  
186  Toonen v. Australia, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.N. Human Rights 
Comm., Selected Decisions of the Human Rights Committee under the Optional Protocol 133, 139, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/OP/5, (2005), available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/SDecisionsVol5en.pdf (“[T]he 
Committee recalls that pursuant to its general comment 16 (32) on article 17, the ‘introduction of the concept of 
arbitrariness is intended to guarantee that even interference provided for by the law should be in accordance with the 
provisions, aims and objectives of the Covenant and should be, in any event, reasonable in the circumstances[.’] The 
Committee interprets the requirement of reasonableness to imply that any interference with privacy must be proportional 
to the end sought and be necessary in the circumstances of any given case.”). See also Human Rights Comm., General 
Comment No. 16, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/REV.9 (Vol. I) (Apr. 8, 1988), available at http://ccprcentre.org/ 
doc/ICCPR/General%20Comments/HRI.GEN.1.Rev.9(Vol.I)_(GC16)_en.pdf. 
187  Letter from ACLU to Eric H. Holder, U.S. Att’y Gen. 3 (Oct. 20, 2011), available at 
https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/aclu_letter_to_ag_re_rm_102011_0.pdf (“A 2009 FBI Counterterrorism Division 
‘Baseline Collection Plan’ obtained by the ACLU through FOIA reveals the broad scope of information the FBI gathers 
during Assessments and retains in its systems: identifying information (date of birth, social security number, driver’s 
license and passport number, etc.), telephone and e-mail addresses, current and previous addresses, current employer and 
job title, recent travel history, whether the person lives with other adults, possesses special licenses or permits or has 
received specialized training, and whether the person has purchased firearms or explosives.”). Information collected by the 
FBI Counterterrorism Division may or may not be related to criminal activity. Id. 
188  See The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, U.N. OFF. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/DigitalAge/Pages/DigitalAgeIndex.aspx (last visited June 29, 2015) (“But at the same 
time it has become clear that these new technologies are vulnerable to electronic surveillance and interception. Recent 
discoveries have revealed how new technologies are being developed covertly, often to facilitate these practices, with 
chilling efficiency. . . . [S]uch surveillance threatens individual rights—including to privacy and to freedom of expression 
and association—and inhibits the free functioning of a vibrant civil society.”) [hereinafter United Nations]; see generally 
Global Principles on National Security, supra note 175. 
189  The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, G.A. Res. 68/167, U.N. Doc A/RES/68/167 (Dec.18, 2013), 
available at http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/68/167; United Nations, supra note 188. 
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upholding the right to privacy by ensuring the full and effective implementation 
of all their obligations under international human rights law . . . .190 
Additionally, the resolution called upon the High Commissioner for Human Rights to 
prepare a report examining the right to privacy in the digital age.191 The report, issued in June 
2014, specifically cites concerns that the U.S. National Security Agency and United Kingdom 
General Communications Headquarters have, together, created technologies that grant access to a 
vast amount of global Internet traffic.192 Furthermore, the report indicates that a significant 
number of human rights other than the right to privacy have been impacted by digital surveillance 
practices including, but not limited to, freedom of opinion and expression, family life, and the 
right to health by the implementation of practices as diverse as torture and drone warfare.193 
Member states and other stakeholders have expressed concerns with unfettered access to Internet 
traffic and requested that guidelines be set to ensure security and privacy within reason for all 
peoples.194 
IX. THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTERSECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
NATIONAL POLICY, AND SOCIAL CONVENTION 
Although the United States prides itself on being a (self-appointed) beacon of human 
rights protection for the international community, its adherence to international human rights 
                                                                  
190  G.A. Res. 68/167, supra note 189, at ¶ 4(c). 
191  Id. at ¶ 5. 
192  U.N. Human Rights Council Rep. of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, The Right to Privacy in the 
Digital Age ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/27/37 (June 30, 2014), available at ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/ 
HRC/RegularSessions/Session27/Documents/A.HRC.27.37_en.pdf (“These technologies have reportedly been deployed 
through a transnational network comprising strategic intelligence relationships between Governments, regulatory control 
of private companies and commercial contracts.”). 
193  Id. at ¶ 14. In addition, the report also indicates that digital surveillance leads to concerns with 
compliance with international humanitarian law. Id. (“There are credible indications to suggest that digital technologies 
have been used to gather information that has then led to torture and other ill-treatment. Reports also indicate that 
metadata derived from electronic surveillance have been analysed to identify the location of targets for lethal drone strikes. 
Such strikes continue to raise grave concerns over compliance with international human rights law and humanitarian law, 
and accountability for any violations thereof. The linkages between mass surveillance and these other effects on human 
rights, while beyond the scope of the present report, merit further consideration.”) The rights referred to in the report 
include rights as listed in the UDHR, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 176, in addition to the ICCPR 
(which the United States has ratified), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 179, and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (to which the United States is a signatory). International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signing Dec. 19, 1966, 933 U.N.T.S. 3, available at 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20993/v993.pdf. 
194  The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, supra note 189. Following on the concerns of member states 
and other stakeholders at the negative impact of surveillance practices on human rights, in December 2013 the General 
Assembly adopted resolution 68/167, without a vote, on the right to privacy in the digital age. Id. In the resolution, which 
was co-sponsored by fifty-seven member states, the Assembly affirmed that the rights held by people offline must also be 
protected online, and called upon all states to respect and protect the right to privacy in digital communication. Id.; see 
also U.N. Gen. Assembly, Rep. of the Third Comm., 23-25, U.N. Doc. A/68/456/Add.2 (Dec. 10, 2013), available at 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/68/456/Add.2. 
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standards leaves much to be desired. The United States voted in favor of the UDHR and has 
ratified the ICCPR and the CERD, but has placed reservations and understandings on these 
instruments to ensure that it has room to maneuver around rights protection as necessary, a 
strategy that is allowable under international law.195 The United States uses public safety and 
national security to undermine the effect of provisions pertaining to discrimination, clarifying that 
the United States guarantees protection for all peoples under the law, yet, in times of emergency, 
the United States reserves the right to implement distinctions “that may have a disproportionate 
effect upon persons of a particular status.”196 Additionally, a U.S. reservation to the CERD denies 
that the convention can authorize action by the United States that is incompatible with the U.S. 
Constitution, and ensures that the United States has the power to determine its degree of 
adherence to conventions by means of domestic precedent based solely on domestic law.197 
The war on terror has caused a shift in the way the U.S. government and American 
society view war and wartime tactics. This shift to a mindset of constant war has made that which 
was once exceptional into the status quo, in addition to adjusting the social conceptions that 
traditionally drew distinct boundaries between war and peace and ratcheting up the level of 
subversion of rights that is commonly acceptable to the public during times of “war.” The former 
General Counsel of the U.S. Department of Defense, Jeh Johnson, stated in a speech at Oxford 
University in 2012 that “‘[w]ar’ must be regarded as a finite, extraordinary and unnatural state of 
affairs.”198 The war on terror, with its unknowable opponent, unattainable objectives, and 
consequently indeterminate duration, shatters that traditional conception and, with it, the 
associated norms of governmental behavior and public expectations. 
                                                                  
195  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 19, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, opened for signature May 23, 
1969. 
196  Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, Volume 1, Chapter IV, 4. International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights—Declarations and Reservations, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION 13, 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20I/Chapter%20IV/IV-4.en.pdf (“That the Constitution and laws 
of the United States guarantee all persons equal protection of the law and provide extensive protections against 
discrimination. The United States understands distinctions based upon race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or 
other opinion, national or social origin, pro[p]erty, birth or any other status—as those terms are used in article 2, paragraph 
1 and article 26—to be permitted when such distinctions are, at minimum, rationally related to a legitimate governmental 
objective. The United States further understands the prohibition in paragraph 1 of article 4 upon discrimination, in time of 
public emergency, based ‘solely’ on the status of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin, not to bar 
distinctions that may have a disproportionate effect upon persons of a particular status.”). See also Multilateral Treaties 
Deposited with the Secretary-General, Volume 1, Chapter IV, 2. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination—Declarations and Reservations, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION 9, https://treaties.un.org/ 
doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20I/Chapter%20IV/IV-2.en.pdf. 
197  Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, Volume 1, Chapter IV, 2. International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination—Declarations and Reservations, U.N. TREATY 
COLLECTION 9 (“The Constitution of the United States contains provisions for the protection of individual rights, such as 
the right of free speech, and nothing in the Convention shall be deemed to require or to authorize legislation or other 
action by the United States of America incompatible with the provisions of the Constitution of the United States of 
America.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). By reserving the right to make distinctions based on race, ethnicity, etc., 
the United States has the ability to circumvent the requirements of the convention and determine and police its own 
policies. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 15-20 (1957) (holding that the U.S. Constitution supersedes international law). 
198  Jeh Charles Johnson, Gen. Counsel of the U.S. Dep’t of Def., Speech Given at Oxford University: The 
Conflict Against Al Qaeda and Its Affiliates: How Will It End? 10 (Nov. 30, 2012), available at http://www.state.gov/ 
documents/organization/211954.pdf. 
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The U.S. government has used the war on terror, to justify a number of rights restrictions 
for U.S. citizens and individuals it has detained on an indefinite basis. This “war” of indefinite 
duration has served as a justification for torture and the expansion of surveillance powers. 
Although the derogation of certain rights is allowed during times of certain predefined security 
crises, its continuation through a perpetual security crisis risks permanent rights infringements, 
and even the ultimate destruction of rights. The increase in rights abuses and racial targeting on 
American soil is but a single consequence of perpetual, normalized war. 
X. CONCLUSION 
The U.S. government has used a heavy hand to sort our nation by color, and continues to 
do so. The cultural and political motives of control and maintenance of the status quo exhibited 
during COINTELPRO are also part of the modern surveillance culture, albeit now more often 
along religious lines and differently drawn ethnic lines. Although current surveillance and 
intelligence efforts are intense, there have been recommendations, as early as 1970, that they be 
intensified further.199 Suggestions ranged from opening physical mail to permitting surveillance of 
any foreign national “of interest” in the United States, and from increasing group-characteristic 
studies to ramping up CIA surveillance of American students and others living abroad: 
(1) “coverage by NSA of the communications of U.S. citizens using 
international facilities;” 
(2) “intensification” of “electronic surveillances and penetrations” directed at 
individuals and groups “who pose a major threat to the internal security” and at 
“foreign nationals” in the United States “of interest to the intelligence 
community;” 
(3) removal of restrictions on “legal” mail coverage and relaxation of 
“restrictions on covert coverage” [mail opening] on “selected targets of priority 
foreign intelligence and internal security interest;” 
(4) modification of “present restrictions” on “surreptitious entry” to allow 
“procurement of vitally needed foreign cryptographic material” and “to permit 
selective use” against “high priority internal security targets;” 
(5) relaxation of “present restrictions” on the “development of campus sources” 
to permit “expanded coverage of violence-prone and student-related groups;[”] 
(6) “increased” coverage by CIA “of American students (and others) traveling 
or living abroad;” 
                                                                  
199  SENATE SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOV’T OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, 
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, S. REP. NO. 94-755, book II, at 113 (2d Sess. 1976). 
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(7) appointment of a “permanent committee consisting of the FBI, CIA, NSA, 
DIA, and the military counterintelligence agencies” to evaluate “domestic 
intelligence” and to “carry out the other objectives specified in the report.”200 
With more than forty years of evolution of technical capacities, executive power, and 
group identity politics, it is possible that even more than this would be desired and carried out by 
the government today. 
What becomes apparent during even a brief recap of governmental profiling and biased 
surveillance activities, coupled with a basic understanding of American history, is that attitudes 
about race and other identities move freely back and forth between law enforcement and the 
public. It is no coincidence that anti-Arab and anti-Muslim country sentiments following 9/11 
paralleled government action against people of Arab and Muslim-country descent in immigration 
and surveillance activities, nor that these types of discrimination have faced a lack of popular 
outcry when limited to immigrant populations and persons of color.201 It would be naïve to think 
the internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II did not have roots in public sentiment 
about the Japanese, fed in turn at least in part by biased portrayals on mass media. It is also true 
that many major advances in the protection of civil rights have been fought every step along the 
way by status quo political forces, and fed by discriminatory social attitudes, in a conflict that 
ranges through social and political battlefields.202 What has been required to force advancement of 
civil rights is effective governmental oversight and public information. Certain situations have 
been easier to monitor—racially segregated schools are fairly obvious. Workplace rights, equal 
access to public and private businesses, and the new push for equality for queer individuals have 
been harder to monitor, but are still largely apparent in the public sphere. But the newer types of 
discrimination and invasions of civil liberties seen here, worked in the relative secrecy of 
immigration courtrooms, NSA bunkers, and secret, redactable FBI files, are tougher to ferret out. 
Coupled with a lack of official oversight, it only stands to reason that this discrimination will 
pervade an intelligence apparatus made up of the very same population that holds, in part, these 
views.203 
                                                                  
200  Id. White House staff assistant Tom Charles Huston made these recommendations, and also 
recommended the use of covert mail opening even though it was “illegal, and there are serious risks involved,” and the use 
of surreptitious entry even though it was “clearly illegal” and “amounts to burglary.” Id. at 113-14. 
201  See Nida Khan, Why People Apparently Don’t Care About Muslim Surveillance or Dead Palestinian 
Kids, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 21, 2014 5:59 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nida-khan/why-people-apparently-
don_b_5607744.html (discussing ties between broad public association of Muslims and Arab populations with terrorism 
and extremism, and the way in which these populations are generally perceived to deserve the abuses perpetrated against 
them that are considered more unwarranted when perpetrated against Caucasians or the U.S. population in general). 
202  There is also evidence that the longer these surveillance apparatuses continue to exist, the more 
compliant corporations will become with them. See Glenn Greenwald et al., Microsoft Handed the NSA Access to 
Encrypted Messages, GUARDIAN (July 12, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/11/microsoft-nsa-
collaboration-user-data. Extensive surveillance might also impact public perception of the acceptability of surveillance 
systems, even if it doesn’t shift individual attitudes towards it, leading to a situation in which people believe, and publicly 
proclaim, that increasing surveillance is acceptable, even though they might not personally be convinced of it vis-à-vis 
their own selves. European Parliament Directorate Gen. Internal Policies, Union Policy Dep’t C, Citizens’ Rights and 
Constitutional Affairs, A Review of the Increased Use of CCTV and Video-Surveillance for Crime Prevention Purposes in 
Europe 9 (Apr. 2009), available at http://www.statewatch.org/news/2009/apr/ep-study-norris-cctv-video-surveillance.pdf. 
203  See generally  Le Blanc, supra note 48 (showing that the type of people who populate the FBI has had 
an appreciable impact on the manner in which the agency pursued its tasks). 
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